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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXI March, 1933 Number 3
RECENT KENTUCKY CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS
W LEWis ROBERTS*
The term future interests is applied to estates which are to
come into the possession of the owner thereof at some future time.
It includes remainders, reversions, executory limitations, possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken.
Also under its caption are treated construction of limitations,
powers, the rule in Shelley's case, expectancies, the rule against
perpetuities and restraints on alienation. Some ten years ago
a series of articles in this journal covered the earlier Kentucky.
cases on the subject and it is the purpose at this time to consider
those decisions that have been reported since that article was
published.1
I. A MEs
In some of the recent decisions the court has taken occasion
to define both contingent and vested remainders. In one opinion
it has said that "a vested remainder is a fixed interest to take
effect in enjoyment after a particular estate is spent, and is an
actual estate which may be sold and the title passed to the pur-
chaser, but, a contingent remainder is one limited so as to depend
on some event or condition, which is uncertain and may never
happen or be performed." 2  Many courts have further pointed
out that a contingent remainder is not a present interest in land.
but at most an expectation of acquiring one in the future. The
Court of Appeals has called attention to the fact that section
2341 Kentucky Statutes has made contingent remainders subject
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, College of Law. A. B.,
Brown; A. M., Pennsylvania State College; J. D., University of
Chicago; S. J. D., Harvard. Author of various articles in legal
periodicals.
38 Ky. L. Sour. 58, 115, 210; 9 Ky. L. Jour. 32, 83, 186.2 I-4nberger v. Cornell, 190 Ky. 844, 229 S. W. 54 (1921).
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to sale and conveyance. The purchaser, however, will receive
nothing unless the contingent remainderman survives until the
event occurs upon which his estate vests. 3 In the case before
the court the testator gave all his estate to Ins wife for life and
one-third at her death to such persons as the wife should direct
by will. The remaining two-thirds was left to the testator's
mother but in case she should predecease the testator's wife then
to the testator's brothers and sisters. The court properly held
that the brothers and sisters' interests in the estate were execu-
tory devises. Their interests would not attach except upon the
contingency of the mother's dying in the life time of the testa-
tor's widow. The brothers and sisters took "executory devises,
with all the essentials, of contingent remainders," the court said.
The court also held in another case where a remainder in
land, after a life estate to the testator's wife, was given to a son
and a daughter, but if the daughter should die unmarried and
without a child or children living then over to the son, that the
son took an executory devise in the interest given to the daughter.
This was subject to sale and conveyance under section 2341,
Kentucky Statutes.4 Where a conveyance was made to a wife
for life and after her death to a daughter for life with remainder
to the daughter's children but if she die without children, the
land to revert to the grantor, a subsequent deed by the grantor
to a third person and a deed by such third person, the-grantor's
wife and daughter back to the grantor, did not defeat the rights
of the daughter's children. The rights of the daughter's chil-
dren could be divested only under the provisions of the Civil
Code of Practice, section 486.r
A gift of a contingent remainder after a life estate raises
the question what becomes of the seism before the happening of
the event which vests the remainder9 Does it remain in the
grantor or in the testator's heirs until the happening of the con-
tingency or is it n nubibus, the clouds, as the early writers con-
tended2 The Court of Appeals considered the question carefully
in Bourbon Agricultural Bank & Trust Co. v Miller6 and decided
3 Ibid., at page 852. See also Fidelity d Columbia Trust Go. v.
Tiffany, 202 Ky. 618, 260 S. W 357 (1924).4 Fulton v. Teague, 183 Ky. 381, 209 S. W 535 (1919).
rClare v. NVichols, 199 Ky. 581, 251 S. W 846 (1923).
0205 Ky. 297, 265 S. W. 790 (1924).
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that the seism during the life tenancy was in the testator's heirs,
but in Crawford v Hisle the court said the seism was in nubibus
until the event happened which vested the remainder. To sup-
port the proposition the Bourbon bank case was cited. The
court, however, m a later case corrected the erroneous position
taken in the Crawford case and said the seisin did not remain in
abeyance until the termination of the life estate and then vest in
the testator's collateral kindred for want of a contingent re-
mainderman, since there is no unvested title to real estate.8
Several cases defing the relative rights of life tenants and
remaindermen have been decided in recent years. A remainder-
man was denied the right to drill for oil on the premises without
having first secured pernussion to do so from the life tenant.9
In the same case a parol agreement to divide royalties from oil
wells on the prenses was held not to be within the Statute of
Frauds. Where a remainder was given an infant upon condi-
tion that he care for the grantor and his wife in their declining
years and the wife on the death of the grantor sent the boy
away against his protests and thus rendered performance of the
condition impossible, it was held is estate in remainder was not
defeated1O A life tenant was not allowed to charge the cost of
repairs to the remaindermen nor against their interests.i" Nor
was the remainderman allowed reinbursements for improve-
ments made before the death of the life tenant.12  The question
when the statute of limitations begins to run against the remain-
derman often arises. Since the remainderman is not entitled to
enter until the death of the life tenant, the statute does not run
against him until that timei 3 As between the life tenant and
the remainderman the former's amicable holding cannot be
adverse to the latter, so where the former occupies during his
life under a void will and sells timber from the premises, is
holding is not adverse to the latter, but where he claims the
T214 Ky. 536, 283 S. W 1019 (1926). See also King v. Wurtz, 227
Ky. 705, 13 S. W (2d) 1043 (1929).8 Slack v. Downng, 233 Ky. 554, 26 S. W (2d) 497 (1930).9Meredith v. Meredith, 204 Ky. 608, 264 S. W. 1109 (1924).
10 
oggess v. Crail, 224 Ky. 97, 5 S. W (2d) 906 (1928).
21 Supra, note 2.
"West v. West, 201 Ky. 498, 257 S. W 706 (1923).
2 S uperior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky. 814, 47 S. W (2d) 973
(1932).
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entire estate under the will and notice is brought home to the
remainderman, the statute of limitations begins to run nme-
diately and not from the time of the life tenant's death.14 While
the remaindermen cannot maintain suit to recover possession
before entitled to possession, they may institute suit to quiet
title notwithstanding the life tenant is an possession. 15 ,
At common law contingent remainders could not be con-
veyed. If a remainderman gave a warranty deed and the estate
finally vested an him, his grantee would be allowed to take under
the doctrine of deed by estoppel. Also such an attempted con-
veyance might be enforced in equity as an executory agreement.
Today, in most states, future contingent interests can be con-
veyed. This result has been reached an two or three different
ways. In Kentucky the court has held that such estates are
interests in land and therefore transferable under section 2M41,
Kentucky Statutes.1 6 In one case, however, the court used
language to the effect that a contingent remainderman does not
have an alienable interest. The decision was correct on the facts
as after purporting to convey his future interest, the contingent
remainderman died before the contingency happened, conse-
quently nothing passed under his deed as vesting was dependent
upon his surviving the life tenant.17
Formerly at common law, if the life tenant attempted to con-
vey a fee simply, he forfeited his estate and the remainderman
could enter at once. If the remainder were contingent and the
remainderman was not determined or the contingency had not
happened which would entitle him to the estate upon the deter-
nination of the life estate, the contingent remainder was de-
stroyed by the tortious conveyance by the life tenant. Tins was
so because the feudal conception of seisin required a particular
estate to support the contingent remainder. All this has been
changed by statute s and a contingent remainder now will not
fail for want of a particular estate to support it. Also by stat-
ute' 9 where a life tenant purports to grant a greater estate than
:
4Hargis v. Flesher Petroleum Co., 231 Ky. 442, 21 S. W (2d) 818
(1929).
' Wels v. Cornish, 237 Ky. 236, 35 S. W (2d) 308 (1931).
-1 Clay v. Clay, 199 Ky. 4, 250 S. W 829 (1923).
ITKendrck v. Scott, 200 Ky. 202, 254 S. W 422 (1923).
"sKentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1930), See. 2346.
"Ibid., Section 2291.
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he has, the conveyance will be effective to transfer what estate he
does have. It follows from these two enactments that if the life
tenant attempts to convey a fee simple the remainderman's in-
terest %s not accelerated so that he may enter at once.20 Where
the remainder is vested, however, and the prior life estate is
surrendered, the remainder will accelerate and become a present
estate.
2 1
II. PossnILrrY OF REVERTER
A possibility of reverter is the right of the grantor of an
estate to have the ownership revert or come back to him upon
the expiration of the estate granted, provided such estate was
granted for so long as the land should be used for a certain pur-
pose or a certain event did not happen. It is not a present
interest in land but a mere possibility of acquiring an estate in
the future. The estate comes back to the grantor or his heirs
upon the happening of the event specified in the original grant
and no act like re-entry is necessary on the grantor's part as is
the case in a right of entry
Testators have sometimes caused confusion by using tech-
nical words, such as "remainder" and "revert" in such ways as
to cause difficulty in construing their wills. For instance in one
case a testator said the "remainder to revert" The court
pointed out that a remainder never reverts. 2 2 It was claimed-in
this case that the testator used the word "remainder" in its
technical or legal sense and thereby gave his wife and son only
a life estate. A provision that if the grantee should die without
leaving children, the land should "revert" to the grantor's
estate was held to mean his whole estate in the sense of sum total
of possessions and not his heirs. The court said the deed pro-
vided for returning the interest conveyed whether it was a pos-
sibility of reverter or a contingent reversion, subject to convey-
ance of the fee thereof by a subsequent absolute deed by the
grantor and his wife. 23 It is difficult to tell just what the court
means by the term "contingent reversion" A reversion is
-' Supra, note 13.
=Brooks v. Stuat, 233 Ky. 235, 37 S. W (2d) 56 (1931).
=Miller v. Dinwiddie, 198 Ky. 360, 248 S. W 874 (1923).
"King v. Wurts, 227 Ky. 705, 13 S. W (2d) 1043 (1929).
KENTUcKY LAw JOURNAL
created by operation of law. It is the interest n the land which
the grantor has not parted with. It is a present vested interest
the enjoyment of which, as m the case of other future interests,
is postponed. If there is a contingency as to whether the estate
will come back to the grantor, the court must have meant a pos-
sibility of reverter by the term and its use in this instance was
redundant. It would seem that the grantor in this case had at
most a possibility of reverter, which at common law could not be
conveyed since it was not an estate. It could, however, be re-
leased to one in possession. The second deed to the son, there-
fore, would be effective as a release of the grantor's possibility
of reverter. On similar facts the court so held in an earlier
case. 24 The inalienability of a possibility of reverter was pointed
out by the court in a later case.25 An interesting case was pre-
sented as to the nature of a possibility of reverter where land
was conveyed for school purposes with the provision if it should
cease to be so used it should revert to the person then owning
the larger piece from which the land in question was taken.26
The court avoided the difficulty of settling the nature of the
reversionary right and correctly held it was void under our
statutory provision as to perpetuities. As pointed out by the
Tennessee court in a case27 involving snnilar facts, the deed
created an executory limitation, that is a shifting use, in favor
of whoever should be the owner of the larger tract of land at the
time the lot in question should cease to be used for school pur-
poses, but as this might not vest within lives in being, twenty-
one years and ten months from the time of the original convey-
ance it would be void under the rule against perpetuities. Since
this limitation over to whoever nnght be the owner of the origi-
nal lot at the time the smaller lot ceased to be used for school
purposes was void, the result would be that there would be a pos-
sibility of reverter in the original grantor and since a possibility
of reverter is not within the rule against perpetuities, the land
in this case should go to the grantor if living, if not, to his heirs.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in effect, at least, recognized
2
.BeZZ v. Lynn, 207 Ky. 757, 270 S. W 20 (1925).
Wa~ker v. Irvne's E xr., 225 Ky. 699, 9 S. W (2d) 1020 (1928).
Duncan v. Webster County Board of Education, 205 Ky. 86, 265 S.
W 489 (1924).
" Yarborough v. Yarborough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S. W 36 (1925).
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that the reservation of the right to land granted upon the pro-
vision that it ceased to be used for a certain purpose might be
given to a person other than the grantor in an earlier case.23
There the grantor conveyed land to a turnpike company for a
tollhouse with a provision that on the cessation of such use the
land should revert to certain named persons. As the limitation
over was to persons in being it did not come within the rule
against perpetuities and was held valid.
It would seem then, that since under the doctrine of shift-
ng uses the estate given for a definite use and over to a de-
signated person other than the grantor creates a good executory
limitation in such third person, the rule that a possibility of
reverter cannot be assigned or created in a third person is not of
much force today
III. EXECUTORY LiMrAr TIONS-EXECUTORY DEvisEs
A devise to take effect upon the happening of some future
event was early held good n equity and became good at law upon
the adoption of the Statute of Uses. Likewise estates created by
deed to become effective upon some contingency were held good.
They were early designated springing and shifting uses. The
term executory limitations includes both springing and shifting
uses and executory devises. These estates may be created on fees
and not exclusively after estates less than fees as was the case
with remainders. Under our statutes "any estate may be made to
commence in future by deed, in like manner as by will, and any
estate which would be good as an executory devise or bequest,
shall be good if created by deed." 2 9  Where a testator devises
is estate to Ins wife for life, remainder to Ins son and daughter,
share and share alike, but if the daughter should die unmarried
and without a child or children living, then her moiety to go to
the son, it was held the daughter took a vested remainder subject
to be defeated by her dying unmarried and childless in the life-
time of the wife. The interest devised to the son in his sister's
moiety was not a contingent remainder because it was limited
after a fee, but it was an executory devise. Here since both son
'8Patterson v. Patterson, 135 Ky. 339, 122 S. W 169 (1909).
2Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1930), Section 2341.
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and daughter joined in a deed together with the life tenant,
their grantee got a good title to the fee. 30
The court has on one or two occasions overlooked executory
limitations and said that a limitation over after a devise of a fee
is void.3 1 In a recent decision the Court has set forth the cor-
rect vew. It said. "Some confusion has arisen in the opinions
of courts, and which we have not escaped, in failing to distinguish
a technical common law remainder, which must be supported by
a prior particular estate, and a future interest taking effect as
a fee in derogation of a defeasible fee devised or conveyed to
the first taker. When the latter character of future interest is
created by a will it is known in the law as an 'executory devise'
and when it is created by a deed it is commonly designated as a
'conditional limitation', and in either event it. is given effect as
a 'shifting or springing use.' "132 The same language was used
by the court in a case decided three years earlier. 33
IV PERSONAL PROPEMTY
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has accepted the prevalent
view in regard to future interests in personal property It
refers to a future beneficial interest in personalty as one in
remainder, regardless of whether it is perishable or given in
specie. Thus where there was a bequest of personalty to a hus-
band for life with power to dispose of the same, "during his
lifetime," for his support, maintenance, comfort and pleasure,
with a gift over of any part that should not be disposed of to a
nephew, a valid remainder was created in the nephew.34
V CONSTRUCTION Op LilITATION S
The court has often been called upon to construe words and
phrases in both deeds and wills affecting limitations on future
estates. The court is repeatedly asked to determine the mean-
ing to be given to such expressions as "heirs", "legal heirs",
"children", "bodily heirs", or "heirs of the body", "dying
10 Supra, note 4.
-"Beemon v. Utz, 217 Ky. 158, 289 S. W 221 (1926).
'1McWilliams v. Havely, 214 Ky. 320, 283 S. W 103 (1926).
Ewersng v. Ewenng, Exr., 199 Ky. 450, 251 S. W 645 (1923).
Lanciscus v. The Louisville Trust Co., Exr., 201 Ky. 222, 256 S. W
424 (1923).
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without children", "dying without heirs", or "dying without
leaving issue"
(a) "Hetrs", "Hers at Law"
The phrase "heirs at law" has called for judicial interpre-
tation recently The question has been put to the court whether
a wife is an "heir" of her husband. The court pointed out in
one case that "heirs at law does not ordinarily or according to
its legal technical meaning include a surviving wife." But in
the particular case a remainder to a son's "heirs at law" meant
distributees, including the son's surviving wife.35 The estate
consisted principally of personalty and the testator had expressly
said no husband of any daughter should "be deemed her heir at
law." In another case the court held that a widow was not an
"heir" of her husband but that she was a "distributee" of his
estate under sections 1403 and 2132 of the Kentucky Statutes. 36
Again the word "heirs" in a will is a word of limitation and not
of purchase unless it appears it was used in the sense of "chil-
dren."3 7 In a will "her heirs" were held to mean "children"
where the parties designated as heirs were not heirs of the widow
but heirs of the widow's husband under whom they held.33
(b) "Children"
Although "children" is ordinarily a word of purchase and
not a word of limitation, it may be used in the sense of "heirs"
as a word of limitaiion and will be so construed where the
language of the whole will shows it was so used.3 9 Likewise in a
deed granting land to a parent and his "children", it was con-
strued as a word of purchase and vested a life estate in the parent
with a remainder in the children, but here, too, the court will look
to the entire instrument to deterune the meaning of the gran-
tor.40 In a devise to a granddaughter and "her children, the
heirs of her body", it was held a fee tail was created in the testa-
" Fidelity & Columbza Trust Co., Gan. v. Vogt, 199 Ky. 12, 250 S. W
486 (1923).
1Allen v. Foth, 210 Ky. 343, 275 S. W 804 (1925), Vandyke v. van-
dyke, 223 Ky. 49, 2 S. W (2d) 1057 (1928).
'1Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky. 566, 1 S. W (2d) 968 (1928).
'8Shhaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S. W (2d) 949 (1928).
Goggzn v. Reed's Exr., 211 Ky. 256, 277 S. W 268 (1925).
4CHicks v. Jewett, Tr., 202 Ky. 61, 258 S. W 934 (1924).
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tor 's granddaughter, which was converted by section 2343, Ken-
tucky Statutes, into a fee simple. "Children" here was con-
strued as "heirs" as -t was used in that sense by the testator.41
Where the grant was to A and "the heirs of her body forever"
the word "forever" was said to have a technical meamng and
when used with "children" the two words were construed as
words of limitation and not of purchase. "Children" when fol-
lowed by "forever" means "heirs.' " 42 The court divides the
cases into three classes (1) "devises by a father or mother to
a son, daughter or blood relation, in which the language 'to hin
and his children forever' is used, (2) devises to a blood relation
and ins children, where the word 'forever' is not used followed
by the word 'children;' and (3) devises by a husband to his wife
and her children' In the first class "children" is construed as
"heirs" and the children take no interest in the property In
the second class children take a fee simple subject to a life estate
n their parent. And in the third class the children also take a
fee and their parent a life estate. This result is deemed to carry
out the intent of the testator as he would not want the land on
his wife's death to pass to strangers.43
A bequest of personalty to the "children now living" of
testator's brothers and sisters was held to include grandchildren,
who were allowed to share per sttrpes.4 4 This was contrary to
the general rule that "children" does not include grandchildren.
(c) "Heors of the Body"
In a devise to a son for life "and at his death then to the
heirs of his body, in fee forever and share and share alike, ten-
ants in common", it was held that both the son's children and
grandchildren took.45 In construing the phrase "to R and Ins
bodily heirs" in a deed, the court held a fee tail was created
which section 2343, Kentucky Statutes, converted into a fee
simple;46 but a devise to a son and his bodily heirs after Ins
death was held in another case not to create a fee tail, convertible
4Martin v. Martin, 203 Ky. 712, 262 S. W. 1091 (1924).
42 Williams v. Ohso Valley Bankzng & Trust Co., 205 Ky. 807, 266
S. W' 670 (1924),Vilson v..Morrill, 205 Ky. 257, 265 S. W 467 (1924).
4 Sower, Tr v. LilZard, 207 Ky. 283, 269 S. W 330 (1925).C arter v. Carter, 208 Ky. 291, 270 S. W 760 (1925).
,Yarrsngton v. Freeman, 201 Ky. 135, 255 S. W 1034 (1923).46Barrett v. Ray, 206 Ky 834, 268 S. W 534 (1925).
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under sections 2343-2345. It was a life estate m the son with a
remainder an fee an his bodily hears. The fact that the testator
gave the son's widow dower an the land showed an intent that the
son should have a life estate.4 7 Where other language an a will
shows that the testator used the phrase "heirs of'her body" to
mean "children", the children took a vested remainder.48 It is
also held that "heirs of the body" means lineal descendants and
not heirs an the ascending lhne.49 A devise of an undivided
interest an land for the devisee's natural lifetime with remainder
to her legal heirs of her body gave the devisee a life estate only 50
Also a grant to a married woman and "the heirs of her body
begotten" altho generally construed as a fee tail, was held to give
a life estate to the grantee and a fee to her children, as heirs of
the body were referred to an the instrument as the grandchildren
of the grantor.51
(d) Gifts Over Upon Death Without Issue
"Dying without issue", "dying without heirs", or "dying
without children" may refer to death before that of the testator,
to death during the lifetame of the life tenant, or to death at any
time, that is, an indefinite failure of issue. Since estates tail no
longer exist as such an Kentucky, the last of these constructions
would be bad under the rule against perpetuities. The statute52
provides that "unless a different purpose be plainly expressed
an the instrument, every limitation in a deed or will contingent
upon a person dying 'without heirs', or other words of like
import, shall be construed a limitation to take effect when such
person shall die, unless the object on which the contingency is
made to depend is then living, or, if a child of hIs body, such
child be born within ten months next thereafter." This abolishes
the common law rule as to an indefinite failure of issue.
In 1904, the court after carefully reviewing the earlier cases
4Ieeves v. Tomlin, 213 Ky. 547, 281 S. W. 522 (1926).
4Bentley v. Consolidation Coal Co., 209 Ky. 63, 272 S. W 48 (1925)
Manntng v. McGinmns, 212 Ky. 451, 279 S. NV. 668 (1926).
49 Crawley v. Crawley, 231 Ky. 831, 22 S. W (2d) 268 (1929).
5Bentley v. Kentland Coal - Coke Co., 242 Ky. 511, 46 S. W (2d)
1077 (1932).5
'Rly v. U. S. Coal & Coke Go., 243 Ky. 725, 49 S. W (2d) 1021
(1932).
5Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1930), Section 2344.
K. L. J.-2
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on the interpretation of the phrase "dying without issue" and
similar expressions, formulated four rules. The cases support
these rules. (1) Where there is a devise of a life estate with
remainder to another and if the remainderman die without issue,
then to a third person, dying without issue refers to death before
that of the life tenant.53 (2) Where the devise is to trustees for
one or more infants until they are twenty-one then to be divided
between such beneficiaries but if any die without issue, bis share
to go to the survivors or if all die, then to a third person, death
without issue there refers to death before the time for distribu-
tion. (3) Where the devise or bequest is to a class and division
is postponed, the limitation is confined to death before the time
fixed for distribution.54 (4) Where there is no intervening
estate, the limitation is inposed and no contrary intent is shown,
a defeasible fee is created which is defeated by death of the
devisee at any time without issue then living.55 These rules,
however, must yield to a contrary intent of the testator as shown
by the whole will. In an excellent opinion in the Atkinson case,
Judge Thomas pointed out that there had been recent decisions
diametrically opposed to each other upon the question before the
court and that the court was therefore called upon to adopt the
line it would follow in the future. The court chose the line in
harmony with the fourth rule stated above.
(e) Determsnation of Classes
In recent years the court has had very few occasions to
decide at what time the membership of a class is to be determined
and thereby settle who is to share in the gift to the class. In
one case a devise to children of another was held to include all
the children of such person born at the time of testator's death
and those born thereafter. A vested remainder subject to open
up and let in after-born children was created.56 The court in
13Weber v. Schroeber, 218 Ky 442, 291 S. W 739 (1927), Rankin v.
Rankzn, 227 Ky. 169, 12 S. W (2d) 319 (1928), Perkins v. Clark, 242
Ky. 782, 47 S. W (2d) 705 (1932).
'Howard v. Howard's Tr., 212 Ky. 847, 280 S. W 156 (1926).
5Atkznson v. Kern, Tr., 210 Ky. 824, 276 S. W 977 (1925), Light-
foot v. Beard, 230 Ky. 488, 20 S. W (2d) 90 (1929), Littell v. Littefl,
232 Ky. 251, 22 S. W (2d) 612 (1929), Foreman v. Gault, 236 Ky. 213,
32 S. W. (2d) 977 (1930), Thurman v. Northwestern -fut. Life Ins. Co.,
245 Ky. 303 (1932).
5 Supra, note 37.
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tls case also followed the early common law rule that a woman
is presumed to be capable of bearing children as long as she lives.
'Where a testator devised land to Ins daughter and her chil-
dren "to be entailed for their use and benefit", the daughter was
held to take a life estate as the testator did not intend to create
an estate tail, which under section 2343 of the statutes would
become a fee simple in the daughter.
57
(f) Defeasible Fees
During the past year the court considered a case in which a
devise was made to a wife with a subsequent provision that if she
should marry the estate should be put in trust for the benefit
of the testator's surviving children, the court defined a defeasible
fee as a fee simple of which the grantee or devasee becomes-
vested subject to divestment upon the happening of some con-
tmgeney provided by the deed or will.58
VII. POWERS
A person may be given the right to dispose of property
regardless of whether he has ownership or not. Such a right is
referred to as a power. The court in sustaining a limitation
over after a life estate with power of disposition, went so far as
to say that where the devise is absolute with power of disposi-
tion the gift over of undisposed remainder is void.5 9 At first
glance this statement might seem to be wrong, but it undoubt-
edly represents the law 60 Courts have regarded the gift over
as repugnant to the gifts of a fee. In so doing they have over-
looked the whole doctrine of executory limitations. The grantor
or testator in such case could make such a gift over good by
wording the grant or devise in such a way as to take effect as an
executory limitation.
Where a life estate was devised to a daughter with power to
appoint and there was neither residuary devise nor disposition of
the estate on failure to appoint and the daughter was the testa-
tor's soleheir at law, the reversion after the life estate vested in
the daughter on the testator's death by virtue of the statute of
" Kerr v. Watknis, 234 Ky. 104, 27 S. W (2d) 679 (1930).
' Wa7ker v. Walker's A(Imr., 239 Ky. 501, 39 S. W (2d) 970 (1931).
C0 ra-ig v. Raermnan, 199 Ky. 501, 251 S. W 631 (1923).
0* Kales, Estates, Future Interests (2d ed.), Section 719.
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descent and she held the estate in fee simple.61 There was a
merger in such case of the life estate and the reversion. The con-
veyance of the interest to which the power is appendant ex-
tmguishes the power. The court said the conveyance by war-
ranty deed of the life tenant extinguished the power.62 A power
may be limited, that is be a special power, as where the devise
is to testator's wife with a power of disposition thereafter
"amongst any of the children." This was held to give the widow
a life estate with the right to dispose of it by deed to any of
the children during her life or by will at her death.6 3 That an
exercise of a power may be void because of fraud was shown in
a case where the person having the power agreed to appoint to
one who pronsed to pay off the appointor's debts and to pay an
annual slum to his widow. This was so even though there was
provision in the will for a disclaimer.6 4 The court said the cor-
rect rule is "if it is plain that the intention of the donee in the
exercise of the power is not to benefit the appointee unless and
except some benefit results to the donee or another not the object
of the power" the appointment is void.
VIII. Ruiis ix SHELLDY's CASE
Section 2345 of the Kentucky Statutes abolishes the rule in
Shelley's case. It provides that wherever by deed or will an
estate is given to a person for life and after his death to his heirs
or heirs of his body, it shall be construed as a life estate in such
person and a remainder in fee in his heirs. The rule in Shelley's
case gave such a person a fee simple, regarding the gift to his
heirs as words of limitation and not of purchase.
In a grant to two persons in fee simple with covenants of
general warranty, to be used by them jointly for and during
their natural lives and at the death of either of them is or her
respective one-half interest to vest in his or her respective heirs
at law in fee simple with power in the grantees during their joint
lives, or the survivor of them, to convey, created a life estate
with power to convey a fee simple.6 5 Had the rule in Shelley's
61 Kentucky Statutes (Carroll, 1930), Sections 1393-1408.
I'Mountjoy v. Kesselman, 225 Ky. 55, 7 S. W (2d) 512 (1928).
1 Supra, note 38.
0 Chenoweth v. Bullitt, 224 Ky. 698, 6 S. W. (2d) 1061 (1928). See
Chenault's Gdn. v. Metropolitan Idle Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 504, 53 S. W (2d)
720 (1932).
Robertson's Gdn. v. Robertson, 215 Ky. 14, 284 S. W 109 (1926).
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case been in force, a fee simple in the first takers would have
been created. A devise to A for life and then to be equally
divided amongst her then living children, and the descendants
of such children who may die, created a life estate with conting-
ent remainders. Tis left a reversion in the testator winch
descended to his heirs and "not a possibility of reverter." The
court pointed out that the rule m Shelley's case would have
given a different result. 6
IX. EXPECTANCIES
The Kentucky Court of Appeals stands alone on the proposi-
tion that an expectancy cannot be conveyed. Attempted convey-
ances of a child's expectancy in Ins parent's estate have been
uniformly held invalid.67 This is so even where the conveyance
is by warranty deed. The title of the grantor when it vests in
such land will not pass to his grantee under the doctrine of deed
by estoppel.6 8 The court has based its stand on such attempted
conveyances of expectancies on section 210 of the Kentucky Stat-
utes, which provides that a sale or conveyance of land m the
adverse possession of another shall be null and void.69
X. Tn Ru u AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The common law rule concerning perpetuities, as defined by
Professor Gray, provided that no interest in property "is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life m being at the creation of the mterest."7 0 The
earlier English cases so formulated the rule that it hit at both
'remote vesting and restraint on alienation. At the middle og
the nineteenth century several state legislatures attempted to
codify the rule. That of Kentucky Statutes, section 2360, origin-
ally passed in 1852, is quite typical. It provides that "the
absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limita-
tion of condition whatever, for a longer period than during
the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the
66 Walker v. Irvine's Exr., supra, note 25; see also Crawley v. Craw-
ley, supra, note 49.
aPendley v. Lee, 233 Ky. 372, 25 S. W (2d) 1030 (1930).
The Consolidation Coal Co. v. Riddle, 198 Ky. 256, 248 S. W 530
(1923).0 Riggsby v. Montgomery, 208 Ky. 524, 271 S. W 504 (1925).
"Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd ed.), Section 201,
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estate and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." Tins
statute has caused a great deal of confusion. It is worded as a
rule against restraints on alienation but was evidently intended
to state the common law rule against perpetiities, which has
come to be a rule against remote vesting of estates, due largely
to the influence of Professor Gray The idea of the legislature
in so wording the statute was that if land could not be alienated
before a remote period it could not vest before that time and
hence the restriction tended to a perpetuity On many occa-
sions the Court of Appeals has expressly said that this section
of the statutes is declaratory of the common law rule and was
intended only as a statute against perpetuities, not one dealing
with the right of alienation.7 1 The court at other times has
overlooked these declarations and has treated the statute as a
rule against restraint on alienation.72 The question seems now
to be settled that the statute is to be regarded as a rule against
remote vesting.- 3  The rule is concerned with whether the estate
may possibly vest beyond the period named and not with the pos-
sibilities of its so vesting. If it may possibly vest at a time
beyond the named period, it is void. 7l Thus a devise after a life
estate to testator's widow, to a son and Ins then wife during their
natural lives and to the survivor and on the death of the sur-
vivor, to their children or lineal descendants, was void as to the
limitations following the life estate to the son's wife. It was
possible that the son might marry a woman not born at the tine
of the testator's death. 5 The "life or lives" mentioned in the
statute are not necessarily lives of beneficiaries but may be lives
of persons foreign to such estate7" A devise of a remainder to a
grantor's grandchildren is too remote,7 7 and this is so where each
grandchild was to receive his share upon reaching twenty-two
years of age.7 8 'Where the beneficiaries under a gift bad in part
' Cammackc v. Allen, 199 Ky. 268, 250 S. W 963 (1923), Stafford v.
Wright, 228 Ky. 594, 15 S. W (2d) 456 (1929), Fidelity & Columbia
Trust Co. v. Tiffany, supra, note 3; Clay v. Anderson, 203 Ky. 384, 262
S. W 604 (1924).
"Perry v. Metcalf, 216 Ky. 755, 288 S. W 694 (1926), Bowling v.
Grace, 219 Ky. 496, 293 S. W 964 (1927).
Chenoweth v. Bullitt, supra, note 64.
'4 Ibid.
Ibid.
I'Clay v. Anderson, supra, note 71.
71Laughlin v. Elliott, 202 Ky 433, 259 S. W 1031. (1924).
" Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Tiffany, supra, note 3.
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because of remoteness in vesting failed to ask the court to elimi-
nate the void part of the gift, the whole gift was defeated.7 9
XI. RESThAINT ON A iENATiON
As already pointed out the cases show a confusion of the
doctrine that property should not be made inalienable and the
doctrine that all interests must arise within a prescribed period.
A recent decision of the court has definitely settled that section
2360, Kentucky Statutes, does not apply to restraints on aliena-
tion of vested estates,8 0 although prior to that decision the court
had erroneously stated that it did.91
In Kentucky, as elsewhere, a total restraint on the alienation
of a fee is bad. It was pointed out. by the court many years ago
that the right to alienate is an inherent and inseparable quality
of every vested fee simple title.8 2 The court said that to hold that
alienation could be restrained during the lifetnne of the fee
sinple holder would be to deprive the fee of all its essential qual-
ities. However, such restraints on the alienation of a fee as the
court deems reasonable will be sustained. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals has gone farther in allowing limited restraints than any
other court. As to what is reasonable in such a case, the court
will itself decide. It has held a provision prohibiting the sale
of a farm for thirty years from the date of the will void.83  A
stipulation that property was to be kept intact as long as all
testator's surviving children lived was construed to allow aliena-
tion when one of them died and the clause was held valid.8 4 A
provision that land should not be alienated during the parents'
lives, was a condition subsequent and not a covenant and render-
ed a conveyance voidable and not void upon alienation in viola-
tion of the condition.8 5 A deed of an heir, in violation of a
restraint in the ancestor's will providing the land be not sold
until the testator's youngest child should become twenty-one
years of age, was voidable, as the restraint was not unreason-
"West v. Ashley, 217 Ky. 250, 289 S. W 228 (1926).
10 Chenoweth v. Bu~litt, supra, note 64. See also Cammack v. A7len,
supra, note 71.
= Perry v. Metcalf, supra, note 72; Bowling v. Grace, supra, note 72.
1Harkness v. Lisle, 132 Ky. 767, 117 S. W. 264 (1909).
Perry v. Metcalf, supra, note 72.
Cahill v. Pelzer, 204 Ky. 644, 265 S. W 32 (1124).
SHale v. lkhorn Coal Co., 206 Ky. 629, 268 S. W. 304 (1925).
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able8 6 Where land was devised to testator's daughters to man-
age and divide the emoluments of the land, a restriction that the
land be not sold until the death of the last surviving daughter
and then be divided among the daughters' children, was held
valid. The remainder was held to be vested m those then living,
subject to be opened up to admit children born thereafter to
testator's daughters.87 The court has recently held a restriction
on alienation for twenty years good and a conveyance in violation
thereof voidable by the grantor or, after his death, by his heirs.
The forfeiture, however, must be enforced during the restricted
period.88
The general rule as to restraints on alienation applies to
personal as well as to real property Where a gift of bank stock
was made with a provision that it should not be sold or converted
into money "so long as said banks do business," the restraint
was held void as an unreasonable restraint.8 9
Finally, in a very recent decision, the court has held invalid
as a restraint on alienation a condition that the homestead
devised "should not be sold out of the name of Counts." The
court said that whether the restraint imposed on alienation was
for a reasonable period must be decided upon the particular and
peculiar circumstances presented by each case.9 0
CoNcILUSION
In conclusion it can be said that several points concerning
the law of future interests in Kentucky have during the past ten
years been more clearly defined. The court has definitely
adopted the view that the seisin when a contingent remainder is
created, remains in the grantor or, in case of his death, in his
heirs, until the happenng of the event on which the remainder
is to vest, and not the view that it remains sn nub ius until that
time. The law as to possibility of reverter and as to executory
limitations has been more clearly expounded. There is a tend-
ency, also, to construe terms like "heirs", "children" and
"dying without issue" in both deeds and wills, with greater urn-
Howard's Admx. v. Asher Coal Minzng Co., 215 Ky. 88, 284 S. W.
419 (1926).
8Anderson v. Simpson, 214 Ky. 375, 283 S. W 941 (1926).
"Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S. W 1084 (1926).
"Stafford v. Wmrght, supra, note 71.
C1 ounts v. Counts' Gdn., 230 Ky. 141, 18 S. W (2d) 957 (1929).
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formity The court has definitely settled that section 2360, Ken-
tucky Statutes, is a restatement of the common law rule against
perpetuities and not a statutory rule against restraint on aliena-
tion, and the court has reaffirmed its position that there may be
reasonable restraints on the alienation of even a fee simple but
that it will itself determine what is .a reasonable restraint under
all the circumstances of the particular case.
